In response to Alan Holland's ‘Darwin and the meaning in life’ (Environmental Values18: 503–518) I argue that there can be room in a Darwinian world for talk of value, in the sense of interpersonal reasons to promote, preserve or cherish some of the states of that world, or to be glad about those states. Darwinian theorists can recognise a range of intrinsically valuable states of affairs, from the pleasure or the happiness of creatures to their flourishing, and need not discard axiology in general. The context of the passage criticised by Holland is explained to show that I was attempting to supply a vocabulary (such as ‘reasons to be glad') usable by religious sceptics as well as believers, for comparing worlds with parasitism and predation and worlds without them; the shape of such comparisons is further delineated. Reasons for being tentative about trans-world comparisons are also supplied.
