Spillover Effects of Recruiting Teachers for School Turnaround: Evidence From Tennessee

Abstract

Many districts and states have implemented incentives to recruit teachers to low-performing schools, and previous research has found evidence that these incentives are effective at attracting teachers. However, effects on the schools and students these teachers leave behind have not been examined. This study focuses on the spillover effects of recruiting effective teachers to Tennessee’s Innovation Zone (iZone) schools. We find the short-term effects of losing these teachers range from −0.04 to −0.12 SDs in student test score gains, with larger negative effects when more effective teachers leave. However, combining both these negative effects in schools teachers leave and the positive effects in iZone schools yields overall net positive effects.

Keywords

achievement at-risk students educational policy educational reform equity school/teacher effectiveness econometric analysis longitudinal studies policy analysis quasi-experimental analysis regression analyses secondary data analysis

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