Abstract
This analysis attempts to look again at the major concepts of the “new philosophy of science” in terms of their relevance for educational research. The argument is made that such concepts as underdetermination and incommensurability have limited applicability to many areas of educational research. This is due to the fact that such terms are based on the existence of genuine theories as found in the natural sciences, and the requirements for such theories cannot be (presently) met in the human sciences. There is also the related problem of ambiguity on how these terms are to be applied exactly to the field of educational research. The analysis further contends that writers in this area have not dealt with the critical concept of indeterminacy. It is argued that of all the concepts of the new philosophy of science, this term has most promise for defining the direction of educational research. From one view, indeterminacy may suggest even a greater degree of relativism; looked at from another angle, it is seen that indeterminacy is a means of structuring and fruitfully debating the purpose of educational research.
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