Abstract
Theory and practice in evaluation in particular and in applied social science in general are principally focused on methodological issues and on instrumental conceptions of knowledge use while relegating questions about morals and values to the periphery. Drawing on recent writing in social and political philosophy, particularly the critique of the liberal democratic tradition, the author examines liberalist beliefs and their consequences for contemporary thinking about evaluation. He outlines an argument for restoring moral discourse to the center of our concerns about evaluation practice and examines what such a restoration might entail.
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