Abstract
In assessing the threat that terrorists could use a biological agent for malicious purposes, experts often look for two characteristics of any potential perpetrator: capability and intent. In other words, does the person or group have the necessary tools and have they expressed interest in causing harm? This type of analysis can inform strategies to prevent and respond to biological attacks, but the findings are not always black and white. Indeed, recent events suggest the process is growing muddier.
One potential threat is that posed by scientists working in sophisticated state biodefense programs. In light of the recent FBI findings that Bruce Ivins, a scientist working within the U.S. biodefense complex, was the sole perpetrator of the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, the issue of capability takes on greater meaning.
Since 2001, the United States has invested nearly $50 billion in its civilian biodefense program. Additional funding has been provided for the military's biodefense program. Much of this money has gone toward developing the infrastructure to prepare for and respond to a biological attack–for example, developing vaccines and drugs, and deploying a nationwide system of air samplers to detect an agent. Federal funding has also gone to expanding laboratories (such as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases [USAMRIID] at Fort Detrick, Maryland, where Ivins worked) and building new government, academic, and contractor high-containment labs where scientists can experiment with a range of microbial and toxin agents of concern and develop vaccines and drugs. Claiming that too much transparency could reveal vulnerabilities in the nation's biological defenses, U.S. officials have not released a detailed accounting of all of the work being undertaken as part of this expansion, which has raised suspicions among friends and foes about the program's goals.
When the FBI released details of its investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, it revealed that it investigated about 100 scientists, including Ivins, who had access to the flask of anthrax bacteria it had determined was the source of the material in the attacks. USAMRIID, which runs the lab where this flask was kept, has security measures in place to limit the “insider” risks posed by scientists who work with dangerous biological agents. But the Ivins case raises the question of whether these measures are sufficient. A vast majority of the scientists working within the U.S. biodefense complex are performing strictly legitimate research, and most are unlikely to have the specific expertise to weaponize pathogens, but it's clear that the stability and intent of every scientist working worldwide in state biodefense programs cannot be guaranteed. (In addition, the U.S. government suspects that certain state biodefense programs are being used as a cover for offensive research and development.)
To address this uncertainty, governments across the globe should demonstrate the intent of all parts of their biodefense programs. By being more transparent about what work is being done and to what ends, states would increase international confidence that they are working to prevent the next biological attack and not contributing to it. Because the United States has the world's largest biodefense program, it must lead by example.
To further reduce the risk posed by rogue scientists, countries should also reduce the number of labs that work on dangerous biological agents and the number of scientists involved. It is not only ironic, it is dangerous, that while the United States has spent more than $700 million on biological threat reduction in the former Soviet Union since 2001–securing pathogen collections and engaging former bioweapons scientists in peaceful activities–it has expanded the number of facilities and personnel working with dangerous biological agents within its own borders, without adequate transparency.
The details of the FBI anthrax investigation are likely to raise further questions both in the United States and abroad about the inadvertent risks associated with the U.S. biodefense program. The many well-meaning scientists within the U.S. program who work to protect public health have as much to gain as anyone from tightening personnel security, clarifying the program's size and scope, and increasing transparency.
By being more transparent about biodefense research, states would increase international confidence that they are working to prevent the next biological attack and not contributing to it. Because the United States has the world's largest biodefense program, it must lead by example.