Abstract
To understand Russia's defense policy, the general who drafted the country's nuclear doctrine suggests, “Watch what Moscow does, not what it says.”
When it comes to analyzing Russia's nuclear attitudes, one must understand that there exists a vast gulf between what is said and what is done. Statements made by Russia's military and political leaders are–perhaps not surprisingly–quite different from actual Russian policy. These discrepancies have been at best misunderstood and at worst exploited–including by hawks in America who use the inflated talk from Russian officials, active-duty and retired generals, legislators, political scientists, and military commentators to argue for a more aggressive U.S. posture toward Russia. Unfortunately, when these arguments make their way into the mainstream dialogue, the repercussions could be serious; they might affect not only congressional thought during the next update of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, but also U.S.-Russian relations.
The problem stems from a misreading of Russian behavior. In Russia–as in other nations–talk is often bigger than reality. Such talk can come from the highest echelons. In Russian President Vladimir Putin's May 2006 address to the Federal Assembly, he declared: “We must have armed forces that fight simultaneously in global, regional, and, if needed, several local conflicts.” It is obvious that the only adversaries Russia could engage with on a global level would be the United States or NATO, and it is also obvious that Moscow could never meet such a demanding military requirement as Putin requests (nor, for that matter, could Washington). Yet when this statement is taken at face value, it is easy to see how some might use it to substantiate claims of anti-U.S. or anti-NATO sentiment in Russia and then go a step further and argue that it must be countered with a new, tougher U.S. nuclear posture.
The only adversaries Russia could engage with on a global level would be the U.S. or NATO, and it is obvious that Moscow could never meet such a demanding military requirement.
It is not just Russian officials' comments that sometimes seem to imply that the United States and NATO are considered in Moscow to be the enemies; it can appear codified as well. Take, for example, the 2003 Priority Tasks for the Development of the Russian Armed Forces, which says the armed forces should “use the available capabilities in a time of war to hold off an enemy aerospace attack and, after a full-scale strategic deployment, operate simultaneously in two local wars.” Again, no nation other than the United States–often perceived in Russia as the leader of NATO–could be the country in question when the possibility of a space attack is mentioned.
Though Priority Tasks sounds straightforward, it would be hasty and incorrect to assume on the basis of one excerpt that Russia's military doctrine characterizes the United States and NATO as enemies. In another section, Priority Tasks takes a different tone: “Partner relations with the U.S. and NATO at the armed forces level correspond to a new level of political relations and have allowed [the creation of] additional mechanisms and institutions for ensuring global stability…. One of the top priority projects facilitating interaction with the U.S. and NATO is the creation of the Russia-NATO Council based on the decisions made at the Russia-NATO meeting held in Rome in May 2002. The efforts undertaken by this council have allowed [for the development of] a more comprehensive system of communication and consultations between Russia and NATO in crisis situations, as well as the procedure for forming joint military units in conflict zones.”
So when faced with two versions of Russian reality from the same official document, how should one interpret things? The answer is simple: Watch what Moscow does, not what it says.
Though Russia's relations with Washington and NATO are far from perfect and riddled with contradictions–witness Russia's desire to join NATO coupled with its fear of the organization's eastward expansion–Moscow's actions speak louder than either Putin's words or the military's papers. The real Russian policy toward the United States and NATO is manifested in the activities of the nearly 20 working groups that operate within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council. That includes joint training and exercises, peacekeeping activities, and Russia's effort to ensure military interoperability for full-scale participation in various NATO operations.
Russia has made great strides in cooperating with NATO, and therefore with the United States. In 2004, it participated in joint exercises with Italy in the Ionian Sea; with the United States in an exercise called Northern Eagle; and with France in the first entry of a Russian nuclear submarine into the French naval base in Brest. Furthermore, Russia participated in a special tactical exercise called Accident 2004. The purpose of the exercise, which was attended by 49 observers from 17 NATO member-states, was securing nuclear weapons from unauthorized access and managing the consequences of terrorist attacks. In 2005 and 2006, Russia participated with NATO in an antiterrorist operation called Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean. Its guided missile cruiser Moskva, large landing ship Azov, and several frigates from the Black Sea Fleet took part in joint patrols with ships of NATO nations. Russia-NATO theater ballistic missile defense (BMD) exercises took place in 2005 in the Netherlands and in 2006 in Moscow.
Of course, obstacles to Russia's cooperation with NATO haven't disappeared, and in fact new ones have been appearing. U.S. plans to deploy strategic BMD in Poland and the Czech Republic have caused a serious deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations. One of the reasons for this is that the current U.S. administration takes strategic decisions unilaterally. While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said that Moscow was briefed on the U.S. plans, Russia apparently finds this format of relations unsatisfactory. Russia needs more than a mere briefing when the United States or NATO takes such steps; intensive, all-around consultations and negotiations from the start would have been appropriate.
Another obstacle is the expected invitation for Ukraine to join NATO. Further expansion of NATO toward Russia makes Russia's military and strategic location more vulnerable. Ukraine hosts elements of Russia's strategic missile early warning system, and its industrial infrastructure supports maintenance of Russia's intercontinental ballistic missiles. If Ukraine joins NATO, Russia would likely lose two out of eight extremely important radars in Mukachevo and Sevastopol, and the Russia-Ukraine military technology cooperation would probably be destroyed.
There has been some fear in U.S. corridors of power that Russia is giving a greater role to its nuclear weapons than a traditional deterrent capability. Statements made by Russian officials, including the president, the minister of defense, and the chief of general staff at times have seemed to point to this, but nothing has happened that would substantiate this claim. Instead of prepping its arsenal for a preemptive capacity, Russia is instead preserving its retaliatory ability (maintaining, at great cost, highly survivable components and mobile land- and sea-based missiles). One must admit that actual nuclear policy, as well as the entire military policy, is determined not by announcements but by the real condition of the nuclear forces, the armed forces, and the implementation of their development programs.
Some also claim that Russia has lowered its threshold for nuclear use. This is untrue, but when the argument comes from America it is nothing short of ironic. After all, Washington first started talking about the preemptive use of nuclear weapons soon after George W. Bush became president. And the U.S. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff allows for the use of preemptive nuclear strikes on an enemy that is using or just planning to use weapons of mass destruction. Now that is a good example of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to an unprecedented level.
Washington should assume most of the responsibility for removing any obstacles to a true partnership with Moscow to counteract actual global threats. The first order of business should be eliminating the unjustifiable preservation of a state of mutual deterrence between the two powers. It makes no military-political sense, yet is preserved at the level of logistics and equipment–thousands of Russian and U.S. warheads are on the highest combat readiness level, waiting to be used in preemptive missile launches or launches based on data received from early warning systems.
duly noted
This sustains mutual mistrust and fear of a nuclear strike (deliberate or accidental), however absurd it may seem from a political point of view. And it indirectly but noticeably limits the ability to build a significant strategic partnership. Instead of hyping an imaginary Russian threat, it would make more sense to concentrate on transforming the outdated condition of mutual nuclear deterrence.
Washington should take the initiative to this end. To name a few measures it might take, it could ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, sign new agreements on further strategic arms reduction and on preserving START I's control and transparency measures, or finally set up the Moscow Joint Data Exchange Center for sharing information on missile launches and vehicles (the decision to create the center was made by both countries in 1998, but it has never gotten off the ground).
The purpose of this analysis is not to justify the controversial and inconsistent Russian statements and documents related to national security. They do indeed exist and can be flabbergasting. Yet it is counterproductive to argue that such statements justify the revision of U.S. nuclear posture in terms of Russia; instead of fearing one another, the two powers must build a strategic bilateral relationship. Such a process will naturally create some friction. But as Rose Gottemoeller of the Moscow Carnegie Center has said, it is best to treat such disagreements as “family quarrels” and not try to look for a black cat in a dark room when it is not there.
Supplementary Material
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
Supplementary Material
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty