Abstract
In the struggle to keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands, add complacency to the list of enemies.
When earlier this year I released a survey of experts on proliferation issues, many of the subsequent headlines focused on the predictions that an attack somewhere in the world with weapons of mass destruction was a significant and growing danger. The experts' collective judgment was that there is a 29 percent chance of a nuclear attack in the next 10 years and a slightly greater chance of a biological or chemical weapons attack. The odds that someone will set off a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb,” were put at 40 percent. Also, there was general agreement that several more countries will join the nuclear weapons club in the next 10 years. Although there was a range of opinions on each question, it is clear that the experts view these issues with the same urgency I do.
Those headlines, and many of the accompanying stories, however, didn't go beyond the numbers to look more closely at the survey's findings on the state of nonproliferation efforts both in the United States and around the world. This picture is less dramatic, but nonetheless worthy of attention. The findings show that the United States must continue to accelerate and improve its nonproliferation efforts and that European and Asian countries can play an important role.
For many years, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the number one security threat to the United States, and to much of the world, has been its vulnerability to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During much of the 1990s, however, it was difficult to convey this fact to the public and to many policy makers. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent revelation of Al Qaeda's methods, capabilities, and intentions brought the issue to the forefront of public discussion. The results of the survey I conducted provide greater context to this discussion.
Despite the recent attention and activity regarding proliferation, nearly half of the respondents (47 percent) felt that international nonproliferation efforts had actually regressed in the past year. Likewise, a strong majority, 79 percent, felt their own countries were not spending enough on nonproliferation objectives. Of course, funding is not always the primary obstacle to vigorous nonproliferation efforts. The biggest problem in expediting Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program projects in Russia is not money, of which there is a sufficient amount to undertake all the work currently scheduled, but rather Russian bureaucratic foot-dragging, denial of access to sites, failure to pass Nunn-Lugar umbrella legislation, and other roadblocks.
“New legislation is clearing away red tape, but it is not enough for just the United States to act.
No consensus opinion emerged through the survey on what should be the top nonproliferation priority, but a significant plurality of the respondents said the United States should maintain emphasis on the weapons and materials stockpiles of the former Soviet Union. More than a quarter of the respondents either urged strengthening and expanding the Nunn-Lugar program per se, or singled out as a top priority a specific Nunn-Lugar goal. In particular, a number of experts said efforts should focus on what one respondent called “human proliferation,” that is, the risk that former Soviet (or Iraqi or Pakistani) weapons scientists might sell their expertise to terrorists or rogue states.
The relatively newer threats from North Korea and Iran emerged as the second leading cause of concern. Controlling fissile material worldwide, strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and pursuing nuclear disarmament by the current nuclear weapon states were cited by a number of respondents as issues that should be at the top of the nonproliferation to-do list. At the same time, many survey respondents felt that some of these well-known threats, such as former Soviet weapons stockpiles or Iran and North Korea, are among the most underrated threats and in need of more resources and attention. Ten percent of the respondents listed the danger of biological or chemical weapons falling into terrorist hands as the risk most in need of greater policy focus. According to several other experts, we should be devoting more attention and resources to shipping and port security, and to uncovering and dismantling black market WMD networks, like that of Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan.
At my urging, Congress has moved to enhance U.S. non-proliferation efforts. In 2003 it enacted the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, allowing Nunn-Lugar funds to be used outside the former Soviet Union. New legislation is pending to further strengthen the program by clearing away U.S. red tape that has slowed progress. But it is not enough for just the United States to act. Russia must do more to lift the legal and bureaucratic obstacles that have hindered Nunn-Lugar programs. Countries in Europe and Asia also can make important contributions to nonproliferation efforts. Norway, the Czech Republic, South Korea, and 10 other non-Group of Eight (G-8) nations have agreed to take part in the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which in 2002 promised $20 billion over 10 years for WMD dismantlement and destruction. More countries can and should contribute to this program.
They must also join with the United States in urging Russian officials and the Duma to grant access to important sites, such as Russian biological facilities, and pass the necessary legislation so that the Nunn-Lugar program can get on with the job. These nations should also: support the separate European and Asian efforts to reach negotiated settlements to the nuclear issues in Iran and North Korea; join President George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims to interdict illegal shipments of weapons and materials of mass destruction on the high seas; and actively support–and encourage private sector companies to do likewise–the work of the Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center, which urgently needs assistance in finding commercial employment for thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers.
In the struggle to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists, time is not on our side. Complacency is an enemy in this struggle, and we must seize the moment to turn heightened concerns into concrete actions.