Abstract
Recent U.S. ballistic missile defense diplomacy has placed Japan in confusion as it struggles to grasp the true intentions of Bush administration policy. National missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) are now dubbed simply “missile defense.”
Despite Japan's efforts to continue to collaborate with the United States on TMD research and the official government position that it “understands” the U.S. rationale for moving toward national missile defense, it would be a mistake to assume that Japan embraces U.S.-led missile defense initiatives wholeheartedly. Rather, Tokyo is still keeping Washington at arms length, taking a cautious wait-and-see approach, so as to make a better assessment of where it stands today amid all the controversies involved in the debate.
From a Japanese viewpoint, U.S. ballistic missile defenses raise four questions:
First, what effect will NMD have on U.S. extended deterrence? Japan, after all, has been protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella for more than 50 years. A number of Japanese security professionals claim that NMD would strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. These experts believe that U.S. NMD would enable the United States to be more assertive and committed in protecting U.S. and Japanese interests. There are, however, questions regarding the optimum mix of defensive and offensive capabilities: What is the best balance to ensure the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence?
Some fear the possible rise of an excessively interventionist policy out of a U.S. security policy based on over-reliance on NMD; they worry that Japan as an ally could be dragged into regional conflicts that may be adverse to its own national interests.
Generally speaking, however, the perception in Tokyo is that the Bush administration's “new” stance on missile defense is long on rhetoric but short on details; consequently they do not yet feel an urgent need to express unqualified support or outright opposition.
They nonetheless feel the need to start more active discussions on the issue of the viability of U.S. nuclear deterrence amid the changing post-Cold War strategic environment, and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance as well as for Japan's security policy. They feel that missile defense will be a critical variable in such discussions.
Second, what is the long-term intention behind U.S. missile defense policy, including the connection between theater and national missile defense? During the Clinton years, the United States pursued a two-pillar missile defense plan in which NMD would protect the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles, and theater defenses would protect U.S. allies and U.S. bases abroad from shorter-range missiles. U.S. officials now say that the administration intends to push for a global system, and they say they hope to develop such a system in conjunction with Japan.
What, exactly does that mean? Japan is already engaged in joint missile defense research with the United States, a decision it made in 1998. But if the United States asks Japan to move beyond the current research plan and work together to build a “global” missile defense system, Japan could be placed in a very difficult position–constitutionally, politically, diplomatically, and financially.
For one thing, Japan may be required to share intelligence and command structures with the United States. While there are those who argue that interoperability will be the “tactical glue” between the United States and Japan, other suggest that it could bring new problems to the alliance, as reliance on U.S. warning, intelligence, and tracking satellites would place constraints on Japan's control over its own missile defense system.
This is all speculative, of course. But many in Tokyo feel that the Bush team has yet to provide specific details on what such a system is going to look like. There is also skepticism regarding the technical feasibility of the so-called global system, especially if it were to include a space-based component.
Many Japanese security experts realize that cooperation in missile defense certainly has the potential to strengthen the alliance–but only if there is sufficient domestic discussion within Japan about missile defense issues as well as intensive discussion between Tokyo and Washington. Tokyo certainly does not wish to see the Bush administration take a “here is what we are going to do” approach.
Third, how will Russia and China react? There is a deep-rooted fear in Tokyo that should the United States fail to reach an agreement with Russia and decide to unilaterally deploy a massive NMD system, that action would certainly lead to a deterioration in Russian-American as well as Sino-American relations. That might have spillover effects on Japan's relations with Russia and China, given its cooperation with the United States on the TMD project.
In his May 1 speech at the National Defense University, President Bush called the ABM Treaty a “relic” of the Cold War and spoke about the need to create a new strategic framework. This speech has raised numerous questions and doubts in the minds of Japanese security professionals: What exactly did Bush mean by a new strategic framework to replace the ABM Treaty? How would Bush's proposal for drastic nuclear reductions fit into this new strategy? Is Washington willing to incorporate self-restraining measures in the new framework, or is it just a matter of coming up with a new treaty with superficial political commitment but no mutually binding measures?
The Bush team emphasizes that MAD (mutually assured destruction) is outdated. But, as some Japanese security specialists ask, what could possibly replace it? Even if Washington should come up with a “new” strategic concept, is it just MAD in disguise? What undergirds such questions in Tokyo is the deep-rooted belief that the core principle of the ABM Treaty–the Russo-American strategic predictability that comes with having mutually binding constraints–remains valid.
There are also questions about how China factors into the overall debate, particularly how to position China should there be a new strategic framework to allow U.S. NMD deployment. In Tokyo, there are voices both for and against the need for the United States to acknowledge–implicitly or explicitly–China's minimum deterrent vis-à-vis the United States.
Some Japanese analysts argue that an explicit acknowledgement would help to incorporate strategic predictability into Sino-American relations and thereby help to reduce misperceptions and escalatory policies between the two countries over such issues as Taiwan. Others contend that China is simply not willing to accept any restraints while it is still in the midst of military expansion. Some note that a public acknowledgement of China's deterrence vis-à-vis the United States may lead to high-level strategic stability but could cause instability on a tactical level. Either way, there are concerns over how the so-called new strategic framework might shape up. Even if it does come about, it may in the end look like another U.S.-Russian condominium. Such an arrangement could elicit negative responses from Beijing. Some fear that should China be left out of whatever framework replaces the ABM Treaty, China may have no choice but to pursue an escalatory policy. China would likely expand its missile forces and adopt uncooperative stances in the arms control and nonproliferation arenas. Both would have wide-ranging implications on Japan's security, defense, and foreign policies.
Others doubt that China would be able to credibly respond to NMD deployment, on the basis that Beijing is currently saddled with too many domestic problems to be able to move forward aggressively with a military modernization agenda. Regardless of their particular views of the situation, many Japanese security professionals acknowledge that the Beijing question has not yet been adequately factored into the overall debate, and that Beijing's response will require new calculations for Japanese security.
Fourth, what impact will NMD deployment have on nuclear disarmament? President Bush said NMD comes hand in hand with strategic nuclear reductions, but he gave no hint of a specific numerical target for his proposed cuts in offensive nuclear weapons.
There are concerns that NMD deployment could complicate existing nuclear disarmament initiatives, given that the relative balance of offensive and defensive capabilities will have to be factored in. In addition to questions about how to credibly factor in defensive capabilities that are yet to be proven technically feasible, worries remain that NMD deployment could unnecessarily complicate, if not deadlock, arms reductions–or that it might even stimulate an arms race.
Global nuclear disarmament has long been a significant pillar of Japanese diplomacy. Some wonder whether Tokyo may end up giving Washington a tacit endorsement of NMD, which has the potential to erode the foundations of Japan's nuclear disarmament principles, and argue that this would not serve Japan's national interests.
Some also worry that the possible deterioration in U.S. Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations could lead to Russia and China threatening to take an uncooperative stance in multilateral arms control and nonproliferation negotiations, thereby making agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime obsolete.
Given the increased U.S. enthusiasm for missile de-fenses–especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States–Japan is paying even closer attention to the ongoing debate over the issue. A U.S. decision to deploy an NMD system could affect, in unpredictable ways, Japan's security, defense, and foreign policies.
As the line between NMD and TMD becomes increasingly blurred, Japan's position becomes more delicate. For years, it has worked with the United States in researching a TMD system. But now the United States seems intent on folding TMD into one big missile defense package.
Japan finds itself in a delicate position to voice outright criticism of the U.S. wish to “defend its homeland” since Tokyo itself has come to accept the legitimacy of the idea by initiating a “national” missile defense of its own. An advanced TMD system that it is researching with the United States has the potential to defend all of Japan.
But Japan's lack of explicit opposition to NMD does not immediately translate into explicit support for the Bush initiatives. U.S. missile defense plans involve complex issues that raise serious security and foreign policy concerns of various other countries–allied and non-allied alike.
Japan is waiting for the new administration to fill in the gaps, so it can better assess where it stands and how to position itself relative to all the pros and cons involved. Given that context, the United States will lose more than it gains by rushing into NMD deployment without addressing the concerns of one of its main allies in Asia.
This is not to suggest that the United States ought to immediately give up the idea of NMD altogether. NMD does not have to be an extreme “all or nothing” choice between defense and arms control, nor must it be discussed in zero-sum terms. It is possible for the United States to pursue NMD in tandem with such cooperative efforts as arms control initiatives and confidence-building measures. The biggest challenge in such a combined effort will be how to involve both allied and non-allied countries alike in the process. The United States needs to look for a balance, sooner rather than later.