Abstract
The steadily increasing number of sophisti-cated missiles around the world is cause for concern in U.S. military circles. Because of breakthroughs in commercial computing, satellite technology, remote sensing, and geographic information systems, the range and accuracy of missiles have improved at the same time that their construction and maintenance costs have dramatically declined.
The U.S. Missile and Space Intelligence Center estimates that by 2010 there will be some 8,000 short-range (300-kilometer) ballistic missiles in the hands of potential adversaries. And by 2005, several “hostile” countries will have acquired land-attack cruise missiles. Tens of thousands of anti-ship missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles could also be converted to land-attack roles in the future. As a result of these developments, U.S. troops engaged in combat will be increasingly at risk.
The sensible response is to develop missile defenses. But let's be clear—there's a difference between “theater” missile defenses, which could protect deployed troops, and national missile defenses, ostensibly meant to defend the country against missiles from “rogue” states. Although there are a number of arguments for why the United States shouldn't deploy a national missile defense system, it's more difficult to argue against developing theater defenses.
The Bush administration exaggerates the missile threat to the country. But when opponents argue that the threat from, say, North Korea has not yet materialized, they are admitting that if or when the threat does mature, then national missile defense would be justified. The technical argument—that defenses will never be perfect—is also a trap: It sets up a mind-numbing debate about “the score,” drawing attention away from the essential debate about whether a missile system is needed. You can argue with proponents until you are blue in the face that the technical hurdles are insurmountable, but that won't stop them from wanting a defense.
The question is, can theater missile defenses be intellectually and operationally segregated from the nation's strategic relationships with Russia and China? This is not to suggest that either country should have a veto on something that may or may not be in the U.S. national interest. Rather, to ignore the strategic concerns of two potential nuclear adversaries would only make the world a more dangerous place.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Fox News on July 20, “The fact of the matter is we don't worry about a strategic nuclear attack from Russia at all.” The real fact of the matter, however, is that the full-fledged nuclear war plan choreographed every day by nuclear war planners shows a number of mobile SS-25 nuclear-armed Russian missiles surviving a hypothetical U.S. nuclear strike. As nuclear forces continue to decline, Russia is increasingly dependent on its mobile missiles. In Omaha, it is only good planning to consider whether “limited” missile defenses could intercept these missiles if they were to survive a U.S. attack.
This is Cold War thinking to be sure. But until the White House tells Stratcom in no uncertain terms that national missile defense is not meant as an insurance policy were deterrence to fail, then national defenses will be seen by the other side as potentially destabilizing. They also complicate any effort Washington might make to convince Russia and China that theater defenses would not undermine their security.
Instead of focusing on national defenses, why not work to establish a permanent, international early warning center that is fed up-to-the-second sensor data about the status of the world's nuclear forces?
U.S. military forces will eventually deploy theater missile defenses. Promoters of national defenses would do well to ponder whether a combination of theater systems, deep nuclear reductions, and U.S.-Russian-Chinese cooperation might reduce the threat of a missile attack on the U.S. homeland to such a degree that a national system would merely be a waste of money.