Abstract
What do biological scientist Marcus Klingberg, businessman Shabtai Kalmanovich, table tennis coach Alexander Radlis, and engineers Anatoly Gendler, Gregory Londin, Samuel Makhti, and Roman Weisfeld have in common?
All of them are former Soviet citizens who migrated to Israel long before the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Jews, their immigration rights were guaranteed, and they easily became Israeli citizens under the Law of Return. With their scientific knowledge and technical skills, they settled down, were assimilated into Israeli society, and gradually climbed the social ladder. The presence of a large number of immigrants from their former homeland provided them with much needed social security. And like the native-born sabras, their social mobility was aided by compulsory military service, which in turn provided them with access to sensitive military as well as civilian positions.
Nevertheless, there is something unusual about this group. For a time, all of them disappeared from public life, only to resurface amid ignominious revelations that they had compromised Israel's national security by passing on sensitive and classified information to foreign agents. Although a number of Israelis have been convicted of spying for other countries, these former immigrants all worked for the same master: the KGB.
For years, Israel refused to formally acknowledge the existence of Jewish spies. Even the public admission of their existence and betrayal was considered a threat to national security. Israel also feared that such disclosures would stigmatize immigrants trying to cope with a new social and cultural environment. As a result, spies like Klingberg, Kalmanovich, and the others were quietly removed from circulation, tried in camera, and sentenced in secret. Their family members were forbidden to discuss the issue with the press.
Even when the censorship authorities were forced to lift the media ban, the details that emerged remained vague and sketchy. The available details, however, present certain unmistakable traits and similarities. Most of these spies were recruited and trained by the KGB long before they went to Israel along with thousands of genuine immigrants.
Klingberg, the oldest, was also Moscow's prime catch. He came to what was then Palestine in 1947 and with his scientific skills eventually became the deputy director of the top-secret biological research institute in Ness Ziona, south of Tel Aviv. Similarly, Kalmanovich, who arrived in 1971, immersed himself in Israeli society, built an economic base for himself, and befriended Israel's political, economic, and military leaders. Radlis, who came to Israel in 1979, was recruited by the KGB five years earlier. Weisfeld was recruited in 1976 and Gendler a year later; both were sent to Israel with their families four years later.
Once recruited and trained, they entered Israel along with thousands of other Soviet immigrants. (A substantial segment of the 2.4 million Jews who have immigrated to Israel since its founding in 1948 have come from the former Soviet Union and its East European allies.) Not all the spies, however, began their operations upon arrival. Many remained “sleepers” who could be activated at a later date when they had reached important or sensitive positions.
Radlis, for instance, began his activities within two years of reaching Israel. Weisfeld waited for nearly five years before establishing contacts with the KGB. Londin, however, was different. He started his activities as soon as he arrived in 1973. As a KGB veteran who joined the organization in 1959, he did not need time to acclimatize.
If the published accounts are accurate, Israel is finding it difficult to identify and halt such espionage activities. Radlis, who was charged with passing on information from 1981 to 1988, was convicted only in 1996, long after he ceased to be a spy. Likewise, Gendler worked for the Soviets for over a decade before he was caught and convicted. Londin served Moscow for 15 years before his arrest and conviction in 1988. Kalmanovich, who arrived in Israel in 1972, worked for the Russians until he was caught in 1988.
Once caught, each spy disappeared from circulation. Even their immediate kin rarely knew the nature of their “disappearance.” When Londin “disappeared,” one of his close relatives was told that the engineer “was being treated for some contagious disease.”
While Klingberg exploited various international meetings and conferences for his rendezvous, Radlis used the table-tennis matches in different countries as a cover to meet with his operators. Others used their overseas trips to contact their handlers.
The kind of information they were accused of providing the Soviets differs. Klingberg was convicted of supplying information concerning Israel's chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Radlis was charged with providing information on Israel's political and economic climate and details concerning his reserve duty, including his service in southern Lebanon. Weisfeld was recruited by the Soviets to monitor Israel's relations with the Arab countries, the United States, and Soviet clients in the Third World. Shimon Levinson, a native-born Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldier and former security chief in the prime minister's office, was convicted of passing on nuclear and military secrets to the KGB.
As an electrical engineer, Weisfeld landed in Elco, a Haifa-based electronics firm, and this position gave him access to a major air base. Gendler, who worked with the Israel Electric Company, spied on the IDF and security installations.
Londin, who was a pilot in the Soviet Air Force and an engineer by profession, was suspected of supplying information to Moscow about the Merkava tanks and the Israeli intelligence community. When Makhti found a job in the Israel Aircraft Industries, he became valuable to his Soviet masters. The KGB used Kalmanovich to obtain information about the political and economic situation in Israel.
Some of the spies were paid regularly, while others joined the ranks for ideological reasons. When caught, some pleaded that they were forced to spy on Israel out of concern for family members left behind. For others, espionage was a condition of their emigration from the Soviet Union.
Depending on the severity of their crimes and the terms of their plea bargains, the spies received different but harsh treatment. While Weisfeld was sentenced to 15 years, Radlis escaped with a four-year sentence. Gendler, who pleaded that if he had refused to cooperate with the KGB he would have endangered his relatives still living in Russia, was given an 11-year sentence. Levinson got 12 years for passing on nuclear- and military-related information to Moscow. His position as a senior intelligence officer and security chief in the prime minister's office granted him access to sensitive information, and he worked for the KGB for a decade before he was caught and convicted. Makhti's espionage career ended with a seven-year prison term.
Not all spies are disclosed immediately. It is likely that many others have been caught and convicted for similar crimes, but the government has so far refused any more public disclosures.
Invariably all disclosures about espionage cases in Israel were compelled by judicial interventions. And even when the courts have lifted information bans, the security establishment has managed to keep the details under wraps.
Klingberg was sentenced to a 20-year prison term in 1983, but the Israeli public did not learn of his case until August 1993. Weisfeld was caught and sentenced in the late 1980s, but the details were only made public in February 1997 when the Supreme Court lifted the ban. Likewise, Londin began his 13-year sentence in 1988, but the public ban was not lifted until April 1995, after he had completed more than half his sentence. Makhti's conviction in 1991 was disclosed two years later.
While some of the convicted spies have avoided serving their full prison terms, the security establishment has been reluctant to show leniency. Klingberg's acute medical condition did not prevent the security agencies from opposing and subsequently delaying his early parole.
After repeated requests and political pressures, in 1994 President Chaim Herzog pardoned Kalmanovich after he had served six years in prison. As a condition for commuting the remaining three years, his Israeli citizenship was revoked and he was deported to Moscow.
Both Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Belarus counterpart pleaded for Londin's early release, underscoring his importance and influence in Moscow. Even though Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, rejected their appeal, Londin was eventually released in October 1996 after he had completed more than two-thirds of a 13-year sentence.
If the KGB was interested in political and military intelligence, its successor, the Foreign Intelligence Service (svr), appears to be concentrating on the commercial and technological arena. Israel's focus on high-tech industry and its close economic relations and dependency on the United States are providing new targets for espionage. So far, Gendler is the only Israeli who has been convicted of spying for the SVR.
All of the espionage activities disclosed to the public involve only those who came to Israel during earlier waves of immigration. The disclosures do not include anyone who came to Israel during the mass immigration that began in 1989, a tide of more than three-quarters of a million immigrants from Eastern Europe.
The spies of Moscow–although small in number–may be an inevitable consequence of Israel's liberal immigration policies.