A scientist's work product can usually be rationally appraised apart from ideology. “Bad science” includes formal and material fallacies and poor data; nonoptimal judgment calls and theorizing refuted by later knowledge do not count. In bestowing encomiums, a scientific organization with multiple goals may consider—with caution and wide tolerance—social impact where ideological applications abhorrent to most members or unethical conduct qua scientist become relevant. Members valuing only scientific merit may either effect policy change within the organization or join another. A scientist who extrapolates scientific theory to make social policy judgments should emphasize the limitations of technical expertise in these matters.
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