Children's use of the representativeness heuristic was studied using a modified version of the misconception of chance task originated by Kahneman and Tversky in 1972. 243 participants from Grades 4, 6, and 8 as well as an adult comparison group judged the likelihood of various displays representing six coin tosses. Analysis suggested that approximately half of the participants in all age groups used representative thinking, i.e., judged the irregular sequence to be most probable. However, younger children provided more nonheuristic but incorrect answers than older children or adults. Findings are discussed in light of previous research on children's use of the representativeness heuristic.
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