40 subjects classified by social value orientation as cooperators or competitors played a six-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game in which a simulated participant employed a strategy of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction. Cooperators and competitors did not differ in cooperation, and both groups responded cooperatively to the strategy.
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