In documenting cognitive processes underlying persons' reactions to negative events, counterfactual thinking, hindsight bias, and attribution theory focus on distinct, although not unrelated, aspects of human information processing. Counterfactual thinking highlights the cognitive processing undertaken when persons imagine different courses of action that lead to alternative outcomes. Hindsight bias describes the inflated retrospective estimates individuals make regarding event probabilities that come with the advantage of knowledge about outcomes. And attribution theory concerns the affective and behavioral consequences that result from the perceived causes of events. This essay argues that a more comprehensive understanding of the processes underlying human response to traumatic events results from the integration of counterfactual thinking, hindsight bias, and attribution theory into a single model.
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