This study examined the hypothesis that the extent to which discreditations of eyewitness testimony are effective is in part a function of the strength of the basic physical and noneyewitness circumstantial evidence to which eyewitness testimony adds. Specific guilt-inducing facts were varied within each of two case contexts. In these and other designs, both within- and between-subjects, the hypothesis was supported, though the main result was that it is not difficult to discredit eyewitness testimony. The rival hypothesis that the outcome is an artifact of ceiling effects cannot be rejected for these data.
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