Skinner argues that we know our private world less accurately than we know the world around us because the verbal community cannot directly reinforce knowledge (or discriminations) about private events. This paper examined Skinner's argument and suggests that it is true by necessity and that the argument is, probably, a case of verbal behavior in the forms of tacting and guessing.
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