Participants were randomly assigned to be high or low power and interacted with another who consistently cooperated, or consistently competed, or alternatively cooperated and competed. Results indicate that low power participants acted more cooperatively, were more attracted to, and wanted to facilitate the other's outcomes to the extent the other had cooperated; the cooperativeness of the high power participants was unaffected by the low power person's actions.
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