Abstract
After manipulation of dyad cohesiveness, subjects played a differential power game from the position of low power. Their simulated opponent of high power accorded them benefits (reward) on 0%, 50%, or 100% of the trials. Subsequently the roles were reversed so that the subject had the high power and the opportunity to reward his opponent. Finally, the subjects played a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma game. The results for the power game indicated that the amount of reward the subject gave to his opponent depended upon both the opponent's earlier level of reward and cohesiveness. However, only the cohesiveness manipulation influenced the Prisoner's Dilemma game, with unusually high cooperation resulting over-all. Additional analyses showed that: (a) reciprocation—either reciprocal giving or reciprocal withholding of reward—in the power game promoted cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma; and (b) cohesiveness affected the Prisoner's Dilemma game responses of only those subjects uncertain of which response to expect from their opponent.
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