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Abstract

The thesis is presented that behavioral scientists should ideally be principally engaged in performing inductions, in deriving deductions, and in formulating and testing hypotheses. Adopting Peircean terminology, the activities of induction, deduction, and abduction are analyzed and interrelated. It is suggested that the development of psychology might be accelerated by paying more attention to the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge.

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Philosophy of Science in Contemporary Psychology

Abstract

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References