The effects of opportunities to communicate intentions and requests and the possession of punitive power in a Prisoner's Dilemma game were assessed with a 2 × 2 × 3 design. The results indicated that the availability of power and communication opportunities, with some exceptions, mitigated competition between pairs for 208 college students.
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