Though psychology's only hope of ever becoming a science resides in a phenomenological approach, no mathematical logic presently exists for formalizing adequately a comprehensive cognitive psychology. Such a needed epistemic logic would lose some rules of inference which positivistic, nonepistemic mathematical logics employ. Therefore, if this needed new logic is to provide sufficient deductive power, new rules of inference would be required. The present paper attempts to develop one such new rule of inference.
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