When work on a cooperative task rather than a lower paying individual one entailed risk that Ss could take each other's earnings, Ss who were rewarded in points having no intrinsic value behaved very differently from Ss studied previously who earned money contingent on their responses. Pairs working for money typically ceased cooperating when risk was introduced while those working for points tended to continue cooperating. Use of points both reduced the disruptive effects of taking and led occasionally to periods of inactivity. Comparing these results and previous findings, there may be differences among tasks in the effects of various types of rewards.
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