Abstract
Ss were told that they were going to convince passers-by in the street to sign a petition against air pollution, (a) if this was in accordance with their attitudes (belief-relevant condition), (b) no matter what their attitudes were (belief-irrelevant condition). All Ss filled out a questionnaire indicating the extent to which they generally utilize external cues when inferring inner dispositions. Belief-relevant Ss were more opposed to air pollution than either belief-irrelevant Ss or control Ss who only filled out an attitude questionnaire. Opposition to air pollution was higher among Ss who were classified as dependent on external cues in the belief-relevant and belief-irrelevant groups, but not in the control group. The results replicate former studies which suggested that attitudes are inferred from behavior only when there are cues implying that behavior is relevant to belief. They also add a personality variable which further qualifies the conditions under which such an inference can take place.
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