43 female Ss and 46 male Ss played three Prisoner's Dilemma games. The three games were 100% cooperative, 100% competitive, and 50% random cooperative. The other independent variable was attributed power. The results showed that neither type of game nor attributed power had an effect on game behavior. Small but significant correlations were, however, found between attributed power and type of game when analyzed separately for males and females. Men high on attributed power are more cooperative in an invariable cooperative game whereas high-scoring women are more competitive in an invariable competitive game.
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