Consciousness, which has a superordinate function in very complex, very active servomechanisms, is explicated cybernetically and semantically, these parallel explications being empirically testable respectively by bionics and psychology. Certain configurations of encephalic conductions of neural impulses are regarded functionally as ‘schemata.’ Certain organizations of schemata are grades of consciousness, “are” denoting identity. Consciousness is defined as subjective being of something.
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