Battig's suggestion that psychologists should ignore considerations of simplicity in research strategy and theory construction was disputed in the present paper. Kemeny's analysis of the crucial role of simplicity in selecting an hypothesis to describe a functional relationship was cited. In addition, the view of Popper and others that the simplicity of a theory is closely related to its falsifiability was presented. It was asserted that a simplicity criterion is an essential element of any scientific endeavor and thus should be adhered to more closely by psychologists.
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