Using an experimental approach with 108 MBA students, effects of reputation on the quantity and quality of offers from other players to enter a transaction as well as a player's behavior toward protection against a partner's defection were tested. A purely cooperative strategy generated more and better offers but behavior nearly as consistently reliable was no better rewarded than a pure defection strategy. Also, players with work experience tended to mistrust even strong reputation signals.
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