Vaillant's 2006 paper presents data from a marriage bureau to give evidence on partner-seeking behavior. Three questions may be asked about the nature and usefulness of such work, whether it can (i) measure the efficiency of such bureaux, (ii) indicate the volume of resources devoted to partner search from commercially sourced dating data, and (iii) be used to test hypotheses about preference formation.
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