Relations of Familiarity with Reasoning Strategies in Conspiracy Beliefs

Abstract

The prevalence and resilience of conspiracy beliefs suggest that such beliefs may derive in part from general information-processing mechanisms. Two predictions were tested: conspiracy beliefs would increase as familiarity with the conspiracy increased, and conspiracy beliefs would rest in part on the perception of the alleged conspirators' motive. Participants read condensed versions of four real-life conspiracy theories of varying familiarity, rated their belief in the conspiracies, and explained their ratings. Although belief was not associated with familiarity, participants used different justifications for their beliefs about familiar and unfamiliar conspiracies, relying prominently on motive when the conspiracy was unfamiliar. Preliminary data suggested that participants' beliefs in conspiracies may have been equally strong when they reasoned only in terms of motive as when they reasoned in terms of documented evidence. An additional finding suggested also that beliefs in conspiracies may increase as affiliation with the victim of the alleged conspiracy increases.