MaglebyDavid, Direct Legislation (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1984); MagelbyDavid, “Legislatures and the Initiative: The Politics of Direct Democracy,”The Journal of State Government (Spring 1986), pp. 31–39.
2.
For a summary of such concerns, see KleinWalt, “Can Business Do Anything About the ‘Explosion’ of Initiatives?”Public Affairs Review (1983), pp. 11–22.
3.
OwensJohn R.ConstantiniEdmondWeschlerLouis F., California Politics and Parties (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 36.
4.
BergLarryHolmanC.B., “Losing the Initiative: The Impact of Rising Costs on the Initiative Process,”Western City. (June 1987), pp. 27–44. See also MaglebyDavid in ErtukelA. D., “Debating Initiative Reform: A Summary of the Second Annual Symposium on Elections at The Center for the Study of Law and Politics,”Journal of Law and Politics, 2 (1985), pp. 313–334.
5.
BachrachPeterBaratzMorton S., “Two Faces of Power,”American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), pp. 146–57; BachrachPeterBaratzMorton S., “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,”American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 632–42; BachrachPeterBaratzMorton S., “Power and Its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey Debnam,”American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 900–7; FreyFrederick W., “Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power,”American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), pp. 1081–1104.
6.
JohnsonHiram, as quoted in KirschJonathan L., “Initiatives: Cutting Up the Constitution?,”California Lawyer (November 1984), p. 35.
7.
See MaglebyDavid, op. cit., and Ertukel, op. cit. p. 300. Of course, the wording and constitutional validity of propositions are often challenged in court, but this usually occurs only after a measure has been passed. Over the 12-year period covered by this study, no “reactive” measures (i.e., those most likely to threaten powerful economic interests) have been invalidated by the courts prior to their placement on the ballot.
8.
“Hiram's Folly?”Golden State Report (October 1988), p. 8.
9.
BergLarryHolmanC.B., “Losing the Initiative: The Impact of Rising Costs on the Initiative Process,”Western City (June 1987), pp. 27–44.
10.
Proposition 103 sought to cut automobile, fire, and liability insurance rates by 20 percent, to freeze rates for one year, to force insurance companies to offer “good driver” discounts, and to subject them for the first time to state anti-trust laws.
11.
MarchJames G.OlsenJohan P., “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,”American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), pp. 734–49.
12.
At least 372,178 signatures were required for initiative statutes, and 595,485 signatures for constitutional amendments, to qualify an initiative in 1988.
13.
KimballKelly of Petition Management, Inc. has advocated giving volunteer organizations more time to collect signatures, but notes that as far as his company is concerned, “We don't even need the 150 days we now have.” “Hiram's Folly?”Golden State Report (October 1988), p.8.
14.
LindblomCharles E., Politics and Markets (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 205–208.
15.
VogelDavid [“Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A Dissent From the New Conventional Wisdom,”British Journal of Political Science, 17 (1987): 385–408] has noted that, until researchers can develop an objective measure of just how severely issues affect the interest of elite groups, they can't determine whether “fundamental” issues are blocked from the agenda.
16.
EdelmanMurray, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1967).
17.
See BachrachBaratz, op. cit.
18.
Note that it is not the initiatives that are being classified, but the campaigns surrounding the initiatives. Problems with attempting to classify public policies by predicting initiative impacts (i.e., the expected dispersion of their costs and benefits) a priori or determining them ex post are dealt with in ThomasTom E., Corporate Political Strategy and Influence in the California Initiative Process, unpublished dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1989, p. 37.
19.
A total of 53 initiatives were actually qualified during this period, but three were excluded for technical reasons of data compatibility.
20.
For two 1988 cases, Propositions 97 (Cal-OSHA funding) and 105 (Consumer disclosure), business opposition had to be inferred from the regulatory nature of the initiatives, since no funds were spent in opposition to the measures.
21.
ErtukelA.D., op. cit., p. 315.
22.
Over the course of his career as the “Secret Boss of California,” Samish represented the interests of industries as diverse as liquor, beer, horse racing, tobacco, railroad, and banking, among others. California Commission on Campaign Finance (1985), p. 167.
23.
Ibid., p. 167.
24.
Ibid., p. 24.
25.
Ibid., p. 60.
26.
Ibid., p. 16.
27.
HoeberThomas R.PriceCharles M., “The Persuaders,”California Government and Politics Annual: 1987–88 (Sacramento, CA: California Journal, Inc., 1987), p. 60.
28.
Ibid.
29.
Ertukel, op. cit., p. 316.
30.
BellCharlesPriceCharles, “Are Ballot Measures the Magic Ride to Success?”California Journal (September 1988), p. 382.
31.
Ibid., p. 380.
32.
When an ordinary least squares model is run for 17 four-year cases (since signature requirements change every four years), regressing percent qualified on number of signatures required and number of filings, both coefficients are found to be negative (reflecting the expected inverse relationship). The former is significant at the .01 level of confidence, the latter at the .07 level. The model's R2 is .718.
33.
See OlsonMancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965) for a discussion of the “free rider” and other problems that plague social organizations as they grow larger.
34.
BergHolman, op. cit., p. 29. In fact, the going rate for signature collection is now $500,000 for a statutory initiative, and $750,000 for a constitutional amendment, according to KimballKelly, President of Kimball petition Management, Inc. See “Hiram's Folly?,”Golden State Report (October, 1988), p. 8.
35.
“Experts Explain the Business of Buying Signatures,”California Journal (July 1985), pp. 283–86.
36.
WilsonJames Q., The Politics of Regulation (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1980), p. 370.
37.
See ThomasTom E., op. cit.; MaglebyDavid, op. cit; and LowensteinDaniel, “Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment,”UCLA Law Review, 29 (1982): 505–641.
38.
AinsworthBill, “Initiative Wars: If You Can't Beat 'Em,”California Journal (March 1990), pp. 147–49.