Has Business “Captured” the California Initiative Agenda?

Magleby David , Direct Legislation (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1984); Magelby David , “Legislatures and the Initiative: The Politics of Direct Democracy,” The Journal of State Government (Spring 1986), pp. 31–39.

For a summary of such concerns, see Klein Walt , “Can Business Do Anything About the ‘Explosion’ of Initiatives?” Public Affairs Review (1983), pp. 11–22.

Owens John R. Constantini Edmond Weschler Louis F. , California Politics and Parties (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 36.

Berg Larry Holman C.B. , “Losing the Initiative: The Impact of Rising Costs on the Initiative Process,” Western City. (June 1987), pp. 27–44. See also Magleby David in Ertukel A. D. , “Debating Initiative Reform: A Summary of the Second Annual Symposium on Elections at The Center for the Study of Law and Politics,” Journal of Law and Politics, 2 (1985), pp. 313–334.

Bachrach Peter Baratz Morton S. , “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), pp. 146–57; Bachrach Peter Baratz Morton S. , “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,” American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 632–42; Bachrach Peter Baratz Morton S. , “Power and Its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey Debnam,” American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 900–7; Frey Frederick W. , “Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power,” American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), pp. 1081–1104.

Johnson Hiram , as quoted in Kirsch Jonathan L. , “Initiatives: Cutting Up the Constitution?,” California Lawyer (November 1984), p. 35.

See Magleby David , op. cit., and Ertukel , op. cit. p. 300. Of course, the wording and constitutional validity of propositions are often challenged in court, but this usually occurs only after a measure has been passed. Over the 12-year period covered by this study, no “reactive” measures (i.e., those most likely to threaten powerful economic interests) have been invalidated by the courts prior to their placement on the ballot.

“Hiram's Folly?” Golden State Report (October 1988), p. 8.

Berg Larry Holman C.B. , “Losing the Initiative: The Impact of Rising Costs on the Initiative Process,” Western City (June 1987), pp. 27–44.

Proposition 103 sought to cut automobile, fire, and liability insurance rates by 20 percent, to freeze rates for one year, to force insurance companies to offer “good driver” discounts, and to subject them for the first time to state anti-trust laws.

March James G. Olsen Johan P. , “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), pp. 734–49.

At least 372,178 signatures were required for initiative statutes, and 595,485 signatures for constitutional amendments, to qualify an initiative in 1988.

Kimball Kelly of Petition Management, Inc. has advocated giving volunteer organizations more time to collect signatures, but notes that as far as his company is concerned, “We don't even need the 150 days we now have.” “Hiram's Folly?” Golden State Report (October 1988), p.8.

Lindblom Charles E. , Politics and Markets (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 205–208.

Vogel David [“Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A Dissent From the New Conventional Wisdom,” British Journal of Political Science, 17 (1987): 385–408] has noted that, until researchers can develop an objective measure of just how severely issues affect the interest of elite groups, they can't determine whether “fundamental” issues are blocked from the agenda.

Edelman Murray , The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1967).

See Bachrach Baratz , op. cit.

Note that it is not the initiatives that are being classified, but the campaigns surrounding the initiatives. Problems with attempting to classify public policies by predicting initiative impacts (i.e., the expected dispersion of their costs and benefits) a priori or determining them ex post are dealt with in Thomas Tom E. , Corporate Political Strategy and Influence in the California Initiative Process, unpublished dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1989, p. 37.

A total of 53 initiatives were actually qualified during this period, but three were excluded for technical reasons of data compatibility.

For two 1988 cases, Propositions 97 (Cal-OSHA funding) and 105 (Consumer disclosure), business opposition had to be inferred from the regulatory nature of the initiatives, since no funds were spent in opposition to the measures.

Ertukel A.D. , op. cit., p. 315.

Over the course of his career as the “Secret Boss of California,” Samish represented the interests of industries as diverse as liquor, beer, horse racing, tobacco, railroad, and banking, among others. California Commission on Campaign Finance (1985), p. 167.

Ibid., p. 167.

Ibid., p. 24.

Ibid., p. 60.

Ibid., p. 16.

Hoeber Thomas R. Price Charles M. , “The Persuaders,” California Government and Politics Annual: 1987–88 (Sacramento, CA: California Journal, Inc., 1987), p. 60.

Ibid.

Ertukel , op. cit., p. 316.

Bell Charles Price Charles , “Are Ballot Measures the Magic Ride to Success?” California Journal (September 1988), p. 382.

Ibid., p. 380.

When an ordinary least squares model is run for 17 four-year cases (since signature requirements change every four years), regressing percent qualified on number of signatures required and number of filings, both coefficients are found to be negative (reflecting the expected inverse relationship). The former is significant at the .01 level of confidence, the latter at the .07 level. The model's R² is .718.

See Olson Mancur , The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965) for a discussion of the “free rider” and other problems that plague social organizations as they grow larger.

Berg Holman , op. cit., p. 29. In fact, the going rate for signature collection is now $500,000 for a statutory initiative, and $750,000 for a constitutional amendment, according to Kimball Kelly , President of Kimball petition Management, Inc. See “Hiram's Folly?,” Golden State Report (October, 1988), p. 8.

“Experts Explain the Business of Buying Signatures,” California Journal (July 1985), pp. 283–86.

Wilson James Q. , The Politics of Regulation (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1980), p. 370.

See Thomas Tom E. , op. cit.; Magleby David , op. cit; and Lowenstein Daniel , “Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment,” UCLA Law Review, 29 (1982): 505–641.

Ainsworth Bill , “Initiative Wars: If You Can't Beat 'Em,” California Journal (March 1990), pp. 147–49.