Elsewhere, Bower has developed the distinction between “technocratic” systems designed to help managers use resources selectively so as to achieve high levels of efficiency and effectiveness, and “political” systems designed to insure legitimacy and accountability. See BowerJoseph, The Two Faces of Management (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1983). For the purpose of this article, it is sufficient to recognize that modern organizations of any size require a high degree of sophistication in the way goals are developed, budgets set, capital invested, managers recruited, trained, and compensated, and organization designed and built. Desirable as well is a degree of continuity almost unimaginable in democratic political process. Generally speaking, we will refer to these as administrative and operating systems of organizations, but where it seems convenient, we may call them technocratic.
2.
This is true despite the fact that leading students and practitioners of management such as BarnardChesterSelznickPhilipCyertRichardMarchJamesSloanAlfredRiboudJean have emphasized the political work of the executive. See BarnardChester, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938); SelznickPhilip, Leadership in Administration (Evanston, IL: Row Peterson and Company, 1957); CyertRichardMarchJames, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1983); and SloanAlfred, My Years with General Motors (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1969). For descriptions of Sloan's work, see ChandlerAlfred, Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962). For a description of Riboud's work, see AulettaKen, The Art of Corporate Success (New York, NY: Putnam, 1984).
3.
For excellent discussions of the symbolic role of the chief executive, see PfefferJeffreySalancikGerald, The External Control of Organizations (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1976), and EdelmanMurray, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964).
4.
For a more detailed description of this period, see Continental Airlines (A), Harvard Business School case 9-385-006.
5.
DonaldsonGordonLorschJay, Decision Making at the Top (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983).
6.
Interview with Clark Onstad, April 10, 1984.
7.
For a more detailed description of EG&G and an analysis of O'Keefe's career there, see WeinbergMartha, “The Private Sector Political Entrepreneur: Bernard O'Keefe at EG&G,” in DoigJamesonHargroveErwin, eds., Leadership and Innovation (Baltimore, MD: Hopkins University Press, 1987).
In 1969, during a period of very rapid growth, EG&G experienced a cost overrun on one of its major contracts and the profitability of the company deteriorated badly.
15.
Interview with William Pounds, June 18, 1984.
16.
WiseThomas, “IBM's $5 Billion Gamble: The Rocky Road to the Marketplace,”Fortune, September 1966.
17.
AulettaKen, op. cit., p. 123.
18.
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Harvard Business School case #9-384-082.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Interview with William Sneath, CEO, Union Carbide Corporation, 1972.
21.
Wise, op. cit.
22.
PowerPennsylvaniaLight, op. cit.
23.
Interview with Michael Sachar, joint managing director, Marks and Spencer, 1975.
24.
Interview with Dr. Mario Schinberni, April 25, 1984.
25.
JonesReginald, as quoted in Harry Levinson and Stuart Rosenthal, CEO: Corporate Leadership in Action (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984), p. 49.
