PorterMichael E., Competitive Strategy (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1980); PorterMichael E., Competitive Advantage (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985); OsterSharon M., Modern Competitive Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
2.
BaronDavid P., Business and Its Environment (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993); MarcusAlfredKaufmanAllen M.BeamDavid R., eds., Business Strategy and Public Policy (New York, NY: Quorum Books, 1987); PrestonLee E.PostJames E., Private Management and Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975); ShipperFrankJenningsMarianne M., Business Strategy for the Political Arena (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1984); WeidenbaumMurray L., Business, Government, and the Public, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1990); YoffieDavid B., “Corporate Strategies for Political Action,” in MarcusKaufmanBeam, op. cit., pp. 43–60; YoffieDavid B., “How an Industry Builds Political Advantage,”Harvard Business Review (May/June 1988), pp. 82–89.
3.
Institutional officeholders are best viewed as a part of their institution rather than as interests, even though they may have personal policy preferences.
4.
Since the FDA had already declared the tomato to be no different than a regular tomato, Calgene's alternative was to declare it as GRAS (Generally Regarded As Safe) and market it.
5.
Cemex might have recognized that it was vulnerable to an antidumping petition, since in 1986 U.S. producers had filed an antidumping petition against cement producers in eight countries including Mexico. That petition had been rejected because the International Trade Commission found that the U.S. economy was growing and concluded that the industry had not been materially injured. When the U.S. economy faltered and the construction industry in the Southern tier states contracted, Cemex's U.S. penetration strategy was vulnerable.
6.
Cemex brand bagged cement is sold through 4,500 exclusive dealers.
7.
While the antidumping petition was being decided and appealed, Cemex also conducted limited lobbying activities to make certain that legislators, particularly those in states in which it had operations, understood Cemex's position on the antidumping issue. More extensive lobbying was not worthwhile because the issue was under the institutional jurisdiction of administrative agencies and the judiciary.
8.
The petitioners represented approximately 61% of the industry in the Southern tier states.
9.
The company decided to enter those markets because they were similar to the U.S. market, and volume retailing seemed to work there.
10.
This opposition sometimes forced Japanese retailers to wait up to ten years for approval to open a store. More often, however, the retailer would either drop its plans to enter or negotiate an arrangement with the local merchants.
11.
Toys ‘R’ Us does not design or manufacture toys, so it is not vertically integrated beyond its supply system.
12.
Porter (1980), op. cit., p. 29.
13.
Porter (1985), op. cit., p. 25.
14.
Gale and Buchholz also discuss the relationship between political strategies and Porter's five forces. GaleJeffreyBuchhholzRogene A., “The Political Pursuit of Competitive Advantage: What Business Can Gain from Government,” in MarcusKaufmanBeam, op. cit., pp. 31–42. Yoffie characterizes strategies in terms of the style of approach to political issues. YoffieDavid B., “Corporate Strategies for Political Action,” in MarcusKaufmanBeam, op. cit., pp. 43–60.
15.
Williams addresses the sustainability of competitive advantage. WilliamsJeffrey R., “How Sustainable is Your Competitive Advantage,”California Management Review, 34/3 (Spring 1992): 29–51.
16.
RumeltRichard, “Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm,” in LambR., Competitive Strategic Management (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984).
17.
BartlettChristopher A.GhoshalSumantra, Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1989), p. 14.