See PearsonChristine M.MitroffIan I., “From Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared: A Framework for Crisis Management,”The Executive, 7/1 (February 1993): 48–59.
2.
See von WartburgWalter P., “Political Issue Management with Common Sense,”Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 3/4 (1989): 303–318.
3.
See DemingW. Edwards, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1982); see also JuranJ. M., Juran on Planning for Quality (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1988).
4.
See PearsonMitroff, op. cit.; see also PauchantThierryMitroffIan I., Transforming the Crisis Prone Organization (San Francisco, CA:: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992). These dimensions not only emerge from the research that my colleagues and I have conducted, but also from that of others. As part of a research organization which I direct, my colleagues and I have conducted interviews with more than 500 senior executives in over 200 organizations. The organizations span virtually every kind of business and government agency. We thus have a good reason to believe in the robustness of our framework.
5.
Ibid.
6.
Ibid. Crises range from economic, informational, industrial, perceptual, psychological, and so forth.
7.
PerrowCharles, Normal Accidents (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984).
8.
PauchantThierry C.MitroffIan I., Transforming the Crisis Prone Organization (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992).
9.
See, for example, AyersR.U.RohatgiP.K., “Bhopal: Lessons for Technological Decision-Makers.”Technology in Society, 9 (1987): 19–45; see also SethiS.P., “The Inhuman Error: Lessons from Bhopal,”New Management, 3 (1985): 40–44; see also ShrivastavaP., Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis (New York, NY: Ballinger, 1987).
10.
WeickK.E., “Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations.”Journal of Management Studies, 25 (1988): 308.
