See Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, Securities and Exchange Commission, September 1980, pp. 393–394.
2.
See FlaxEllen, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Questions: 1985 Proxy Season, Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc., October 1985.
3.
See JarrellGreggRyngaerdMichaelPaulsenAnnette, Shark Repellents: The Role and Impact of Antitakeover Amendments, Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, September 1984; JarrellGreggPaulsenAnnetteDavidsonLynne, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, July 1985; PoundJohn, The Impact of Antitakeover Charter Amendments on Contests for Corporate Control, Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc., January 1985.
4.
MonksRobert A. G., “The Institutional Shareholder as Corporate Citizen,” address to the Financial Analysts Federation, October 20, 1984.
5.
See KolmanJoe, “The Proxy Pressure on Pension Managers,”Institutional Investor (July 1985), p. 145.
6.
Testimony of David L. Heald, hearings on pension funds and corporate governance, U.S. Department of Labor, January 10, 1985.
7.
Testimony of Roger F. Murray, hearings on pension funds and corporate governance, U.S. Department of Labor, January 10, 1985.
8.
Testimony of Dean LeBaron, hearings on pension funds and corporate governance, U.S. Department of Labor, January 10, 1985.
9.
Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance Questions: 1985 Proxy Season, pp. 19–21.
10.
The Department of Labor's Enforcement of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, April 1986, p. 6.
11.
Summary of conclusions from public hearings, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefits Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, January 1985, p. 485.
12.
“ESOPS: Revolution or Ripoff?”Business Week, April 15, 1985, p. 94.
