National Power on the Local Stage: How Cable Captured Congress and Cornered Cities

Abstract

This article examines the interaction of national power and local authority in cable television licensing over time. Our work supplements power elite theory in three ways. First, power elite theory focuses on indicators of power such as membership, money, and access; to these we add the availability of alternatives. Second, while power elite research has demonstrated that policy victors are powerful, it is equally important to determine whether the vanquished are powerless. Third, while power elite theory predicts that power will be used to capture policy-making bodies, policy makers can be cornered as well. When used in conjunction, capturing and cornering tactics can lead to policy gains by powerful interests. These ideas provide insight into the political basis of change in a city's cable TV license. Using information from a variety of sources, we find that over time the city lost its early negotiating advantage. By capturing Congress, the cable industry cornered the city and gained an important political victory.