Abstract
Based on D. W. Smith's recent phenomenological account of consciousness, this article seeks to improve our understanding of the unique relation of special ownership (R) that exists between every mental-occurrence instance and its subject, trie one who “has” or “lives” the mental-occurrence instance. The subject is assumed to be a person or animal, although mentioned in passing are cerebral hemispheres as possible subjects of mental-occurrence instances (suggested by observations of people with complete forebrain commissurotomy). R would seem to be essentially different from the person's or animal's relation to other-than-mental occurrences taking place in his or her body, including those that he or she interoceptively perceives (e.g., certain visceral happenings). Using Smith's perspective, special attention is given to “alienated” mental occurrences. These are taken by their subject either (a) as not having a subject (as being “impersonal”) or (b) as having a different subject from their actual subject. It is concluded that the key to R may lie in the referent of the phenomenological “species character” of each mental occurrence. This referent is the subject's particular mental activity (e.g., seeing) of which the mental-occurrence instance is a part and product.
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