A Case Study: The Limits of Workplace Health and Safety Reform in Liberal Economies

There is in Canada among political scientists a general consensus that both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties have greater confidence in the workings of the marketplace in regard to the equitable distribution of “goods” than the New Democratic Party. The Conservatives, however, embrace to a much greater degree an “untrammelled market” doctrine and, thus, are more suspicious of the positive aspects of trade unions. The Liberal Party has its genesis in a “Free Market” doctrine although it has shifted to a “positive concept of liberty” which has a more balanced view on the virtue of “individualism” and less reliance upon the virtues of an unregulated “free market.” While accepting the value of the institution of a market and individual initiative, it has come to support the regulation of the market by bureaucracy and government for social, economic and political pragmatic ends. It is more accepting of “pluralist” values and the role of trade unions in industry or production. It is ideologically opposed to paternalism and/or noblesse oblige, “stewardship,” and so forth. This “pluralist” view was represented in North America by the Roosevelt administration and The New Deal policies in the United States. It was under The New Deal that the Wagner Act was enacted.

The New Democratic Party, consistent with a social-democratic doctrine, is more suspicious of the market and tends to emphasize the inequities of an unregulated market.

These general outlooks by the three major Canadian political parties are, of course, mirrored in their respective approaches to industrial relations.

It should be noted that the NDP Minister of Health and the Minister of Labor in 1972 were both out of the “labor movement.” The Minister of Labor was a member of the Railroad Brotherhood in Moose Jaw. The Minister of Health had been a long-time representative of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union in Saskatchewan. Consequently, the centralization of all branches and units within government that had anything whatsoever to do with occupational health and safety into a single administrative home was not a subject of “organizational imperialism.” On the contrary, the Minister of Health favored the centralization of occupational health and safety in the Department of Labor even though the hygiene unit, radiation, and occupational medical officer were, at that time, in the Department of Health. John Richards, who was Legislative Assistant to the Minister of Health and an MLA from Saskatoon, initiated the task force on occupational health in the Department of Health in 1971, shortly after the NDP was returned to government in June of that year.

This amendment, 68C, was put into the Labor Standards Act, rather than the Occupational Health and Safety Act (1972), so as not to re-open the more controversial Occupational Health and Safety Act for further debate in the legislature. It was then put in the act in 1977.

Section 28 (2) of the Regulations passed in 1981 by Order in Council states that: “Every employer shall ensure that the worker representatives on the committee or, where there is no committee, the workers, are kept fully informed of any information in the employer's possession concerning the work environment and the occupational health and safety of workers in that place of employment…” (Emphasis mine)

This section was enacted into law by Order in Council 437/81 on March 17, 1981, effective 60 days later, May 17, 1981. In most instances, the statutory provisions simply give recognition to what had developed already in practice in Saskatchewan. A section was introduced in the 1981 Saskatchewan Regulations which required an employer to appropriately label chemicals that come into the plant and were thereafter mixed and repackaged for distribution throughout the workplace.

It is impossible to make an accurate estimation of the actual refusals by workers during the first 10 years of the Occupational Health and Safety Act in Saskatchewan. Many refusals took place without an occupational officer or myself, as director of the Occupational Health and Safety Branch, ever learning about the refusal. The 1,500 is an approximation based upon my own assessment of the situation.

For an elaboration of this, see: Sass Robert , The Underdevelopment of Occupational Health and Safety in Canada” in Ecology versus Politics in Canada, edited by Leiss William Dr. , (University of Toronto Press) 1979, pp. 72–96.

This is another way of stating the centrality of work in workers' lives, and to focus upon the intrinsic nature of work as the primary cause of industrial injury. That is, how the work is organized, design of the job, pace of work, repetitiveness, and so forth.

Broyles R. Manga P. Reschenthaler G. , Occupational Health and Safety: Issues and Alternatives, Economic Council of Canada, Technical Report No. 6, Ch. 10, “The Saskatchewan Program,” p. 203.

I always believed that the reason for this unexpected reaction was due to the populist and cooperative tradition in Saskatchewan. The province had the first Social Democratic government in North America in 1944. Cooperatives, especially agricultural co-ops, are important institutions in this prairie province, and every community has its co-op retail store or gas station. Also, farmers sit on school boards, curling rink boards, and marketing boards. Secondly, occupational health was not perceived as a trade union demand by the politicians and farmers. Rather, it was seen as an extension of health care. Saskatchewan was the first jurisdiction in North America to legislate a universal health care delivery system in 1962. It should also be noted that worker “accident prevention committees” were first made mandatory in the Province of British Columbia in 1920. These worker committees had the power to inspect the workplace once a month, to meet, and to make recommendations to the company. In 1945 these all-worker committees became bipartite with management.

From notes taken by George Bryce in, “Changing the Power Relationship in the Workplace,” Working Paper #82–83, University of Ottawa, pp. 40–41 (undated).

Mulder Mauk , “Power Equalization Through Participation?” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1971, pp. 31–38. See also: Mulder Mauk , “Reduction and Power Differences in Practices,” paper read at the seminar “European Contributions to Organization Theory,” Fontainbleau, France, May 13–15, 1975.

“Reduction and Power Differences,” p. 11.

Ibid., p. 12.

For a positive account of the Work Environment Board of the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, see: Thesis by Donald Bobiash entitled “Attempts to Promote Industrial Democracy in the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan,” August 31, 1984, presented as part of the degree requirements for the M.Sc. in Industrial Relations and Personnel Management at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Letter from Robert Sass to the president of PCS, dated December 17, 1981.

Hunnius Gerry , “Report to the Executive Committee of the Work Environment Board” (Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, Mining Division, July, 1982).

Bobiash Donald J. , “Attempts to Promote Industrial Democracy in the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan,” a paper presented as part of the degree requirements for the M.Sc. in Industrial Relations and Personnel Management at the London School of Economics and Political Science, dated August 31, 1984, p. 29. This observation was expressed by Mr. Dick Seal, Senior Industrial Engineer of PCS, to Mr. Bobiash in August, 1984.

Letter to Bob Sass from the Tory Minister of Labor, dated October 25, 1982.

The unions attempted to keep Sass as chairperson of WEB, but management refused, and no compromise was worked out.

Reported in Canadian Occupational Health and Safety News, Vol. 6, No. 5, Feb. 7, 1983.

I am also of the opinion that this “blind spot” extends to the social sciences, which have played little part in raising consciousness in this important area. The same criticism applies to the failure of management studies, including industrial relations and labor law, to incorporate occupational health and safety programs in their respective curricula. This is most evident when one reviews arbitration decisions pertaining to occupational health and safety matters. Students of industrial relations still view “working conditions” as the substantive issues comprising labor standards legislation (overtime pay, statutory holidays, vacations, premium pay), and not dust and noise levels, thermal conditions, chemicals, mists, vapors, and other physical hazards found in workplaces. Needless to say, less attention is given to stressors and stress-related diseases, as well as to work organization and job design questions, all of which have an enormous effect upon the health, safety and well-being of many in our work force. Regrettably, students of both industrial relations and management studies have primarily focused on the “extrinsic” nature of work — time away from work, rather than the intrinsic nature of work — time in work, which produces the wounds and damage to the body, mind, and spirit of workers. At best, these academics and technicians have been only half aware of those categories associated with the intrinsic nature of work. The relationship between the intrinsic nature of work and health and safety remains a grossly neglected subject of empirical study, an immensely important area for public policy considerations. The deficiency in this area has had some impact on public policy and the existing blurred conception of the work environment.