Is the stream of consciousness a temporal continuum or a sequence of distinct awarenesses? The present article considers this question in the context of the different theoretical positions of James J. Gibson and William James. The view favored is one that Gibson's treatment of perceptual awareness per se suggests: Awareness qua brain process is a unitary occurrence that, barring interruptions, expands continuously in the temporal domain for an extended duration. The obvious variation in awareness from moment to moment is construed as continuous change in content belonging to a single, developing process. The contrasting view holds that the stream of consciousness consists of pulses or drops of experience. These are distinct, of course, though temporally adjacent one with the next. James's view was of the latter discontinuous type even when he was proposing his now famous characterization of the stream of consciousness as being, among other things, sensibly continuous.
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