Extensions of Lockean and Kantian concepts offer new insights into the neurophysiology of consciousness. The Identity Theory as presented herein is plausible and leads to major revisions in concepts and their terminologies relating to consciousness: Memory items are regarded as semi-independent rather than as only hierarchical. The concept of representations is revised. It can be seen that the exact determination of the physical side of the identity is of secondary importance to the central concept of the Identity Theory. Consciousness and all of reality ultimately consists, in the mind of the individual, of the qualities to which each individual is limited throughout life. Human beings are restricted in principle from learning the specific answers to the “hard problem(s)” of consciousness except, eventually, as correlations. The restriction results from the inability to observe consciousness from either an “inside” or an “outside” perspective. Meaning, which involves a fundamental function of the mind, is described as equivalent to consciousness at the neurophysiological level even though it is different at the semantic level. According to the Identity Theory, neurons or other physical elements are consciousness and meaning.
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