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Abstract

One-hundred research subjects completed a standardized test measuring moral autonomy, a game-theory exercise measuring belief in the predictability of decisions, a previously published scale measuring belief in free will, and a previously unpublished survey measuring the conceptual structure of evil. Greater moral autonomy was positively correlated with game-theory postulations of predictable decision-making, rather than freely willed decision-making, and was negatively correlated with a factor-analysis theme suggesting that “the nature of evil is revealed by God.” Belief in free will was positively correlated with the theme suggesting that “the nature of evil is revealed by God” and was negatively correlated with themes suggesting that “the potential for evil is within everyone,” that “the reality of others prevents harm to others,” and that “good will prevail over evil.” These results support the conclusion that morally autonomous individuals do not behave as if they have free will. Instead, they behave as if their decision-making is predictable and determined.

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Do Psychologically Autonomous Individuals Behave as if they Have Free Will?

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