The Stream of Consciousness: XXVIII. Does Consciousness Exist? (First Part)

Abstract

I address W. James's intentions in “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” (DCE), and raise critical questions about the direction his theory takes after The Principles of Psychology. My article starts with consideration of a few of James's later statements on what he was trying to do in DCE, and then I closely examine his article for what it tells us concerning his new conception of the consciousness stream. James holds it to be constituted of “pure experiences” that are neither mental nor physical but that may be taken to be either mental or physical. An essential feature of his new conception is one's direct acquaintance with one's experiences. James treats consciousness, in this basic sense, as a crucial part of how one knows anything one does know. For example, knowledge of the sun has a basis in direct acquaintance with certain experiences; one takes some of one's experiences to be a certain physical object, the sun itself, because of their occurrence in a context consisting of certain other experiences that, too, are objects of inner awareness.