The Stream of Consciousness: IV. Adolf Grünbaum's Atomicity

Abstract

I devote most of the present article, which is the fourth in a series concerning the nature and characteristics of William James's stream of consciousness, to an examination of Adolf Grünbaum's case for the stream's atomicity. For this purpose, I use the lens provided by the objection that auditory perceptual experience of a continuous sound of unchanging pitch does not exhibit a discrete, pulsational temporal structure. Also, I discuss Izchak Miller's two criticisms of Grünbaum's claim that temporal awareness of present physical or mental events depends on a certain kind of conceptualized awareness of the stream. Miller argues that such conceptualized awareness, being a matter of judgment, requires rather than explains temporal awareness; and also that perceptual experience necessarily involves individuating the object perceived, which in turn already involves temporal awareness. I give cogent replies to these two criticisms, but I cast some doubt as well on Grünbaum's general account.