Blindsight research provides an opportunity to place James's account of consciousness in an empirical context that is attracting much comment from psychologists. Recently, I briefly indicated some lines along which the neurological phenomenon of blindsight—which results from visual-cortical lesions—is interpretable in keeping with James's conception of the stream in The Principles of Psychology. Although this Jamesian interpretation includes certain theses with which I disagree, I spell it out here in greater detail than I could in my previous article. I do so for the light that it sheds on the kind of conception of consciousness that James was developing. Consistently with James's general theory, no role is assigned to unconscious mental occurrences in this Jamesian interpretation of blindsight. Accordingly, the special deficiency of blindsight consists in the total brain process's bringing states of consciousness into existence whose intrinsic visual-perceptual dimension is inaccessible or unreliably accessible to immediate apprehension.
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