Myers recently published a major work on James's life and thought. The present article reexamines parts of my own understanding of James's conception of consciousness in the light of Myers's advanced interpretation. In particular are addressed James's account of direct (reflective) awareness, the nature of the components of the stream of consciousness, and the significance of James's claim that the stream of consciousness is sensibly continuous.
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