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Abstract

Health care delivery in the United States may be characterized as a dynamic system of conflicting interest groups. Since the reorganization of the medical profession in 1910, however, physicians have been able to maintain their position as a dominant structural interest group. A dominant structural interest in one which is served by the structure of social, economic, and political institutions. It does not have to reorganize continuously to protect its privileged position.

Although several medical sociologists have noted the privileged position of physicians, few have attempted to explicate the process of status maintenance. This paper examines the development of labor law in health care as one example of structural interest influence. Labor law provides an excellent illustration of this influence in that its development and application are far removed from the physicians' sphere of direct influence. It is demonstrated that the ideology that physicians should hold a privileged position is so ingrained that their interests are protected even in their absence.

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Labor Law and Physicians' Privileged Position: An Example of Structural Interest Influence

Abstract

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