Taste versus Fashion: The Inferred Objectivity of Aesthetic Judgments

Abstract

While some evaluations of aesthetic stimuli are assumed to be matters of personal “taste,” other judgments are assumed to be influenced by the prevalent opinions of peers and/or “experts” (e.g., art critics). The nature of this assumption may depend upon the perception that a “correct” answer exists in objective reality. Employing social psychological principles of attribution theory, this study investigates the degree to which subjects' explanations for a target person's reactions to tasks involving color evaluations were influenced by subjects' knowledge of others' choices in the same situation (consensus information). It was hypothesized that the assumed objectivity (or subjectivity) of a judgment is related to the utilization of such information. Participants were provided with brief accounts of fictitious subjects' behavior in three experiments involving reactions to colors. Each “study” involved the rendering of a judgment which was conceptualized as either objective (physical reality), quasi-objective (expert), or subjective (preference). Level of consensus or agreement regarding each judgment was also manipulated. In line with prediction, consensus information exerted an overall effect on attributions but had the most impact in the case of objective judgments. It is suggested that convergence of opinion may lead to the inference that an aesthetic judgment has an external, objective reference; the ramifications of normative evidence for the internal consumption of aesthetics are considered.