Common features between the domains of behavioral decision making and suggestional processes are discussed. These features are allocated to two aspects. First, behavioral decision making and suggestional processes are traditionally considered to provoke inadequate human behavior. In this article arguments are put forward against this interpretation: Actions induced by non-rational decisions and/or by suggestional processes often have adaptive functions. Second, two common thematic issues are discussed (utility functions in behavioral decision making and ambiguity avoidance) which could be investigated empirically within an integrated framework of behavioral decision making and suggestional processes.
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