Radical behaviorism and direct realism attempt to reduce percepts and sensations, respectively, to environmental stimuli and bodily stimuli. Contrary to this attempted reduction, the present research indicates that percepts are not qualitatively distinguishable from after-sensations. Other research suggests that the “peripherally excited sensations” in percepts are nevertheless distinguishable from the “centrally excited sensations” in mental images.
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