The “New Economics” and Industrial Health: An Explanation

Abstract

In a recent issue of the International Journal of Health Services, John Chasse and David LeSourd presented a critical evaluation of what they call the “new” economics of industrial health. The focus of their review is the fairly extensive research over the past decade on the impact of workers' compensation laws on workplace safety and health. They conclude that the work is conceptually and empirically flawed and represents a “dangerous hypothesis” that “… directs research down a ‘dead-end’ road and threatens to influence public policy in a way that could damage the welfare of large numbers of workers” (1, p. 21). Although not presuming to speak for all researchers in this field, I have conducted many of the studies reviewed and would like to demonstrate why I feel Chasse and LeSourd's criticism is misguided and largely incorrect. This response first addresses the theoretical basis for the research and then the empirical evidence. The implications for workers' compensation policy are then briefly considered. While the thrust of these remarks is directed to the general issues raised by Chasse and LeSourd, there are several misinterpretations of specific empirical results and policy recommendations that are addressed.