Counterfactual thinking (imagined alternatives to actual events) influences how people respond to events. This research examined the impact visual imagery has on counterfactual thinking. The present study relied on past findings that indicate that more extreme affective responses to outcomes are a sign that counterfactual thinking has occurred. Participants completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and then read a scenario about a person who either made or lost money as a result of taking an action. The counterfactual alternative was made either salient or non-salient. High VVIQ participants had extreme affective responses (an indication that they generated counterfactuals) across salience conditions; however, low VVIQ participants only had extreme affective responses (suggesting that they only generated counterfactuals) when the counterfactual was made salient. Visual imagery may play an important role in the generation of counterfactuals. Implications for imagery research are discussed.
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